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Missing the Point: Variable Psychology's Blindness to the Problem's Inherent Coherences
I
Every basic scientific conception contains, in some way or another, notions of how its concepts differ from pre-existing everyday assumptions about a particular issue and how one can move from the level of these everyday assumptions to scientific ones. Such notions also exist in traditional academic psychology, where they quite definitely take the form of exclusion criteria. Although phenographic circumscriptions of the problem to be investigated, concept analyses, and general theoretical considerations are not exactly ruled out, they are mostly regarded as mere preliminaries to actual scientific work. This begins when hypotheses of the empirical connection between conditions and events have been derived from theoretical assumptions and been "operationalized" as if-then-statements (i.e. conceptualized as independent and dependent variables) within a research design which allows the hypotheses to be tested according to the rules of inferential statistical procedures. Only in this way, the general reading runs, is it possible to scientifically decide upon the empirical tenability of the preceding theory.
In as far as academic psychology adheres to this model it can befollowing Blumer (1956), a main representative of symbolic interactionism -referred to as "variable psychology". Although this mainly characterizes experimental psychology, it is not only found there; it is also possible and common in various forms of field research. Similarly, "qualitative" research can be classed as variable psychology to the extent that its linguistic analyses, content analyses, etc. dispenses with any variabilization -that is, when the statistical processing/testing of hypotheses is abandoned, even as the final stage or goal of research, and alternative criteria of objectification and verification have been developed instead. In doing so, however, one would largely isolate oneself from psychology's official academic self-concept as an empirical science, which is also represented in its scientific associations. Consequently, the current prevailing psychology (i.e. mainstream psychology) can be specified as "variable psychology".
These considerations lead to a question that can indeed be seen as a central problem of psychological research: what happens to the everyday pre-knowledge about the research topic and the coherence assumptions it includes when, for the purpose of their empirical realization/testing they are "operationalized" and formulated as "variables"? Is it possible to do this without diminishing the full meaning of the problem initially addressed, or does such a "variabilization" entail a foreshortened, one-sided and meaning-bereft version of the original elaboration of the problem and all knowledge about it -due not to methodological shortcomings, which are in principle avoidable, but "systematically", as a consequence of the epistemological limitations of variable psychology as such? In the past, there have been intensive debates on such fundamental questions (see, for example, Boring's well-known "operationism" symposium published in Psychological Review in 1945). I myself dealt with this topic in Theory and Experiment in Psychology (1963) . In the meantime, as with other discussions on y basic psychological problems, this issue has largely fallen by the wayside -not because the problem has been resolved, but simply because the scientific community has tacitly agreed not to deal with it any longer.
In the following, I would like to address a particular aspect of this problem which is still highly relevant. On the basis of the subject science approach that we have developed, I will explicate and substantiate the thesis that, for structural reasons, the variable model is blind to, and blinds us to, the coherences and hence also the contradictions within the subject area to be explored. In the following I will explicate and substantiate the thesis that even though certain coherences/contradictions might have been elaborated and termed in everyday pre-knowledge or in preceding phenographic circumscription and theoretical conceptualizations, when it comes to the stage of variabilization required for statistical treatment there is nothing left of them. Thus, one does not gain any deeper insights into the research topic's structure of coherences and contradictions, but, on the contrary, falls behind what is already known
